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I. INTRODUCTION
During the 1990s, the jurisprudence of federalism and free
trade agreements has been revolutionized. Issues of state law
have new, heightened importance. NAFTA and the Uruguay
Round agreements, approved in 1993 and 1994 respectively, re-
quire compliance at the "subnational" (state) level. Such compli-
ance, just now getting underway, involves novel legal
controversies like the stalled border-opening to Mexican truck-
* Associate Professor, University of Baltimore Law School; B.A., summa
cum laude, Columbia College, 1974; J.D., magna cum laude, Harvard Law
School, 1977. The author would like to thank Michael Glennon and Eric
Schneider for their helpful comments; Michael Blumenfeld for his able research
assistance; and the skilled staff of Emily R. Greenberg for its library and com-
puter assistance.
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ing in 1996-97.1 In the next decade, the Executive Branch faces
the major challenge of negotiating and implementing NAFTA
expansion and the Free Trade Area in the Americas Agreement.
This will further necessitate controversial state compliance. 2
Recent federal doctrinal and political shifts, however, have
increased the states' protections against what such agreements
impose. By the 1990s, the Supreme Court's general pro-federal-
ism position 3 had generated new, strong federalism-protecting
doctrines in contexts such as the dormant Foreign Commerce
Clause. The Court refused to override state laws to which for-
eign enterprises objected, such as trade matters involving state
taxation of foreign enterprises and state procurement that dis-
advantaged foreign suppliers.4 Moreover, the President had a
politically limited capability to clear away such state laws. In
the 1990s, Presidents Bush and Clinton found themselves chal-
lenged by the divisive, party-splitting internal politics of free
trade. This made winning Congressional fast-track renewals
and minimal agreement implementation difficult, without
the further burden of trying to challenge American "dual
sovereignty."
These political and doctrinal developments regarding feder-
alism brought forth a new legal paradigm. In the past decade,
as Solicitor and Deputy General Counsel of the House of Repre-
1. NAFTA: Mexican Trucks and Drivers Are Safe for NAFTA Implementa-
tion, Experts Contend, 14 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 408 (Mar. 5, 1997); see also
infra note 83.
2. See, e.g., International Agreements: FTAA Group on Procurement Is
Making Progress, Allgeier Says, 14 Int'l Trade Rep. No. 11, at (BNA) 480 (Mar.
12, 1997); The Administration Weaves the 'World Network of Commerce,' 14 Int'l
Trade Rep. (BNA) 132 (Jan. 22, 1997); Melissa Ann Miller, Will the Circle Be
Unbroken? Chile's Accession to the NAFTA and the Fast-Track Debate, 31 VAL.
U. L. REV. 153 (1996); see also infra note 59.
3. See, e.g., Richard C. Reuben, The New Federalism, 81 A.B.A. J. 76, 78-
79 (Apr. 1995) (discussing the conservative cry for a return to true federalism);
Jenna Bednar & William N. Eskridge, Jr., Steadying the Court's "Unsteady
Path" A Theory of Judicial Enforcement of Federalism, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 1447
(1995); Edward L. Rubin & Malcolm Feeley, Federalism: Some Notes on a Na-
tional Neurosis, 41 UCLA L. REV. 903 (1994).
4. For discussions of the dormant commerce clauses, see, for example,
Martin H. Redish & Shane V. Nugent, The Dormant Commerce Clause and the
Constitutional Balance of Federalism, 1987 DUKE L.J. 569 (arguing that the
dormant commerce clause undermines federalism); Donald H. Regan, The
Supreme Court and State Protectionism: Making Sense of the Dormant Com-
merce Clause, 84 MICH. L. REV. 109, 1193-1202 (1986) (defining protectionism);
Julian Eule, Laying the Dormant Commerce Clause to Rest, 91 YALE L.J. 425
(1982) (encouraging the creation of a coherent set of guidelines for the dormant
commerce clause). See also infra note 15.
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sentatives, I have been in a position to observe the dramatic de-
velopments in the congressionally shaped implementation law
for trade agreements that have responded to these legal and
political shifts regarding federalism. 5 This article argues that
the new paradigm regarding federalism consists of a new form of
"weak" preemption in implementation following state "partner-
ing" in negotiation. In negotiating internationally on state is-
sues, the President seeks volunteered concessions by the states
and tailors his international proposals, negotiations, and actions
to these state concessions. In this regard, the President func-
tions partly as the national director of international relations
and partly as a spokesperson and mediator for a league of sover-
eign states.
In addition to the "partnering" approach, Congress has de-
veloped a remarkable new approach to implementation, dubbed
"weak" preemption in this Article. Ordinarily, it would be safe
to assume that, as governing federal law, substantive principles
in the Uruguay Round agreements and NAFTA displace any
out-of-step state laws. 6 However, by utilizing this new ap-
proach, Congress's implementation laws unobtrusively, yet deci-
sively, reduce the actual degree of internationally dictated
preemptive effect. By denying foreign challengers access to fed-
eral and probably even state courts and by creating layers of
political insulation around the states, Congress's "weak" pre-
emptive implementation laws treat deferentially and protec-
tively the state laws or actions to which foreign enterprises
object. Nothing like "weak" preemption has been encountered
before in the international agreement context.7 Nonetheless, it
bears a conceptual resemblance to past congressional federal-
ism-protecting approaches in domestic matters, such as Con-
5. As Solicitor of the House of Representatives, the author personally rep-
resented the House of Representatives in a number of separation of powers
cases with national security implications, see, e.g., American Foreign Serv.
Ass'n v. Garfinkel, 490 U.S. 153 (1989) (vacating ruling striking down as uncon-
stitutional a limitation in an appropriation bill), on remand, 732 F. Supp. 13
(D.D.C. 1990), and participated in investigations with national security impli-
cations, see, e.g., Report of the Congressional Committees Investigating the
Iran-Contra Affair (1987) (chapter on Boland Amendments co-authored by the
author as the House Committee's Special Deputy Chief Counsel).
6. Ronald A. Brand, The Status of the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade in United States Domestic Law, 26 STAN. J. INT'L L. 479, 486 (1990).
7. See generally Harold G. Maier, Preemption of State Law: A Recom-
mended Analysis, 83 AM. J. INT'L L. 832 (1989) (vigorously supporting
preemption).
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gressional acts protecting state tax systems from federal court
constitutional challenges.
This Article uses several stages to describe the new legal
structure of federalism and federal trade law. It begins with the
older paradigm of the national government's forcefulness vis-a-
vis the states, epitomized by the 1979 Supreme Court decision in
Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles.8 It then discusses the
trade impact of the Court's new pro-federalism state market
participant doctrine and the Barclays Bank9 decision regarding
state taxes. Both the doctrine and the decision have a magnified
effect in light of the structural safeguards of federalism. In the
1990s, the President finds himself squeezed. On the one hand,
he faces the new Supreme Court doctrines that tolerate state
laws disadvantaging foreign enterprises. On the other hand, he
faces the structural problem of Congress, which magnifies the
divisive, party-splitting political opposition to domestic grants of
trade concessions to foreign enterprises. 10
Part III of this Article delves into the emerging paradigm of
"weak" preemption. In the 1990s, trade agreement negotiations
are no longer solely a matter of the national executive branch
exercising a national government prerogative. Instead, negotia-
tions now follow the new "partnering" approach between the ex-
ecutive branch and the states. The Uruguay Round negotiation
of the Agreement on Government Procurement illustrates this
new approach of "partnering" with the states. In making pro-
posals, the U.S. Trade Representative could put forth only what
the states themselves had volunteered. In addition, in imple-
menting NAFTA, the President acted not as an imposer upon
states, but as a mediator among them. Rather than being asked
by states to be left alone during controversies such as the Mexi-
can trucking moratorium of 1996-97, he found himself being
pushed by border state governors to implement NAFTA even
more vigorously.
More importantly, the implementation machinery of the
Uruguay Round agreements and NAFTA demonstrates how
Congress established a novel legal mechanism to reduce the pre-
8. Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434 (1979) (holding
a California ad valorem property tax unconstitutional under the commerce
clause).
9. Barclays Bank v. Franchise Tax Bd., 512 U.S. 298 (1994).
10. For a look at how contemporary Congressional politics squeezes the
President, see Paul Blustein, 'Fast-Track' Trade Plan Pits White House Against
Top Congressional Democrats, WASH. POST, Mar. 22, 1997, at All; see also infra
note 52.
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emptive effect of agreements. Congress virtually took the fed-
eral courts out of the business of striking down state laws in this
context, mirroring the deferential Congressional acts in other
federalism-sensitive areas like state taxes. Simultaneously,
Congress has insulated the states from actions by complaining
foreign governments, first by restricting challenges to govern-
ment-only proceedings and then by denying these proceedings a
direct effect upon states. The new "weak" preemption has in-
trigning parallels among past mechanisms by which Congress
protected federalism. It also raises some unexplored questions
regarding the legal interaction of federal and state authorities.
This Article concludes by predicting the future jurispru-
dence of federalism and free trade. While the President signs
instruments of international law that appear to legally define
state obligations,'1 it is the domestic political process with major
state participation that actually determines these obligations
concretely. How Congress sets up these domestic political
processes will determine how the United States integrates its
"dual sovereignty" system with the international negotiating re-
gime. Only this new paradigm can reconcile free trade agree-
ments with the new federalism.
II. THE 1990s DILEMMA OF FREE TRADE AGREEMENTS
AND FEDERALISM
A. FEDERALISM AND FREE TRADE IN THE JAPANV LINE ERA
As recently as 1979, the Supreme Court powerfully demon-
strated the old paradigm, in which it simply shouldered aside
state laws that disadvantaged foreign enterprises. In the Japan
Line case of 1979, the Supreme Court developed the potent "one
voice" doctrine and employed it in the federalism-sensitive con-
text of state taxation. 12 The case arose from California's appli-
cation of a state property tax to the cargo containers of Japanese
shippers.' 3 The shippers claimed that this method of taxation
violated the dormant Foreign Commerce Clause,' 4 which limits
how much states can interfere with foreign commerce absent
11. See generally Yong K. Kim, The Beginnings of the Rule of Law in the
International Trade System Despite U.S. Constitutional Constraints, 17 MICH.
J. INT'L L. 967 (1996).
12. 441 U.S. at 448-51.
13. Id. at 436-37.
14. Id. at 437-39; U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.3 ("The Congress shall have
Power... To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several
States .... ").
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Congressional authorization.15 The California tax, however, did
not discriminate against out-of-state enterprises, and it had
been held perfectly valid for domestic commerce purposes. 16
Nonetheless, a nearly unanimous Supreme Court, with only
Justice Rehnquist dissenting, struck down California's ap-
proach.' 7 "[Tihe Federal Government must speak with one voice
when regulating commercial relations with foreign govern-
ments," the Court announced.' 8
What is particularly notable about the Court's "one voice"
doctrine is how it released foreign enterprises from getting the
congressional "voice" to speak. Congress had not enacted or rat-
ified anything preempting California's property tax law. In fact,
no statute had clearly expressed a position antipathetic to Cali-
fornia's, or even mildly opposed to it.19 Through the Solicitor
General, the Executive Branch had filed a brief for the United
States as amicus curiae in support of Japan.20 The Court, how-
ever, cited a press release of the European Economic Commu-
nity to show a "risk of retaliation" that "of necessity would be
felt by the Nation as a whole."'2 ' As we will see, the Court's so-
licitude for the executive branch and for the risk of retaliation in
this case markedly contrasts with the Court's approach in the
1990s.
The Supreme Court of the Japan Line era, in effect, volun-
teered to aid the executive branch in clearing away state-created
problems, without awaiting Congressional action. The Japan
Line decision carried over to the federalism and free trade con-
text the jurisprudence that international considerations must
15. For a discussion of the dormant commerce clauses, see, for example,
Mark Tushnet, Rethinking the Dormant Commerce Clause, 1979 Wis. L. REV.
125 (discussing the political theories behind the dormant Commerce Clause);
see also supra note 4.
16. 441 U.S. at 445.
17. Id. at 457
18. Id. at 449 (quoting Michelin Tire Corp. v. Wages, 423 U.S. 276, 285
(1976) (discussing the Import-Export Clause)). The Court said that "with re-
spect to foreign intercourse and trade the people of the United States act
through a single government." Id. at 448 (quoting Board of Trustees v. United
States, 289 U.S. 48, 59 (1933)).
19. In a footnote, the Court cited the Customs Convention on Containers, a
federal regulation, and the Convention Between the United States of America
and Japan for the Avoidance of Double Taxation. Id. at 446 n.10 and 452-53.
Each of these said something regarding containers being associated with ships
or being instruments of international commerce. Neither squarely discussed
state property taxes, as opposed to import duties and income taxes.
20. Id. at 452 n.17 (United States as amicus curiae).
21. Id. at 453 & n.18.
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override state laws, typified by the famous case of Zschernig v.
Miller.22 In that case, all the Supreme Court needed to do to
displace state rules on the descent of property-a realm where
the states, rather than the federal government, have tradition-
ally had the power to make the law-was to consider the state
law as intruding upon the exclusive role of the national govern-
ment in foreign policy. 23
In what might be called a "strong" preemptive approach,
24
the Court cleared a comparatively easy path for the executive
branch in trade relations. Foreign enterprises had a court-
paved road for challenging state laws or actions that disadvan-
taged them, without forcing the federal executive branch to en-
gage in any heavy lifting in Congress. In fact, foreign
enterprises did not even need to work through their own govern-
ments and diplomatic channels to knock out stark state barriers.
Instead, they could apply on their own to the American federal
and state judicial systems, through traditional challenges
against state "protectionist" barriers under the dormant foreign
commerce clauses, and sue a defendant state to have its alleg-
edly protectionist actions struck down.
Today, foreign enterprises also have a possibility of taking
this course of action with regard to another developing state is-
sue: state and local government procurement. A perennial and
growing issue in state procurement is state action that favors
local suppliers and disfavors some, or all, foreign ones. This is-
sue has gradually become more important with the growth of
both state procurement and foreign trade. 25 It arises afresh to-
day in Massachusetts where the state is considering procure-
ment legislation that would disfavor enterprises that have
invested in Indonesia, in light of human rights violations
22. Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429 (1968). There, the Supreme Court
struck down an Oregon statute limiting the rights of East German heirs of an
Oregon decedent because of East Germany's lack of reciprocating recognition.
For discussion, see THOMAS M. FRANCK & MICHAEL J. GLENNON, FOREIGN RELA-
TIONS AND NATIONAL SECURITY LAw 793-94 (2d ed. 1993); MICHAEL J. GLENNON,
CONSTITUTIONAL DIPLOMACY 263-64 (1990).
23. The Court acted without a showing of adverse effect on international
relations, and without a congressional expression of opposition to the state's
approach. 389 U.S. at 459-62 (Harlan, J., concurring).
24. See generally Maier, supra note 7.
25. See Note, Home-State Preferences in Public Contracting: A Study in
Economic Balkanization, 58 IowA L. REV. 576 (1973) (discussing the burden
placed on interstate commerce by home-state preferences in light of an increas-
ingly interstate economy).
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there.26 Disfavored foreign suppliers could challenge such state
procurement laws as violating either the dormant commerce
clauses or trade agreements. 27 Several courts have decided
cases on the question of whether state procurement rules disfa-
voring foreign suppliers violate federal prohibitions. Some
courts have ruled in favor of the foreign suppliers and some have
ruled against them.28
B. SUPREME COURT'S NEW DOCTRINES: STATE "MARKET
PARTICIPATION" AND BARcLAys BANK
Even at the time of the Japan Line decision, the New Feder-
alism movement had already begun in the Supreme Court. The
Burger Court had a general commitment to constitutional doc-
trines that would protect the states from the federal govern-
ment.29 In 1976, the Court first enunciated its "market
participant" exception to the dormant Interstate Commerce
Clause.30 It said that a state government acting not as a regula-
tor of that state's commercial market, but as a decisionmaker on
how the state would handle its own state-funded procurement,
could "exercis[e] the right to favor its own citizens over
others."3 1
26. Sanctions: U.S., European Companies Urge Massachusetts to Reject
Plan to Sanction Investment in Indonesia, 14 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 5, at
179 (Jan. 29, 1997) (discussing the strong opposition to the Massachusetts pro-
posal to impose unilateral economic sanctions on companies with investments
in Indonesia).
27. Note, State Buy-American Laws-Invalidity of State Attempts to Favor
American Producers, 64 MINN. L. REV. 389, 412 (1980).
28. See, e.g., Baldwin-Lima-Hamilton Corp. v. Superior Court, 208 Cal.
App. 2d 803, 819 (1962) (replacing "place of manufacture" provisions with
treaty provisions); Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. Bd. of Comm'rs, 276 Cal. App. 2d
221, 225-29 (1969) (holding the California Buy American Act unconstitutional).
Foreign suppliers did lose some decisions. See, e.g., K.S.B. Technical Sales
Corp. v. North Jersey Dist. Water Supply Comm'n, 381 A.2d 774 (N.J. 1977)
(holding that the New Jersey Buy American provision was not preempted by
GATT, did not interfere with foreign affairs, and was not proscribed state action
under the commerce clause).
29. See, e.g., National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976) (inval-
idating federal minimum wage requirement as applied to state agencies).
30. See generally Benjamin C. Bair, The Dormant Commerce Clause and
State-Mandated Preference Laws in Public Contracting: Developing a More Sub-
stantive Application of the Market-Participant Exception, 93 MICH. L. REV. 2408'
(1995); Barton B. Clark, Comment, Give 'Em Enough Rope: States, Subdivi-
sions, and the Market Participant Exception to the Dormant Commerce Clause,
60 U. CHI. L. REV. 615 (1993).
31. Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794, 810 (1976).
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The Court further elucidated the doctrine in the 1980s, ex-
plaining two applicable considerations. When a state govern-
ment buys or sells for itself, the Court said, the state exercises
"the long-recognized right of trader or manufacturer, engaged in
an entirely private business, freely to exercise his own independ-
ent discretion as to parties with whom he will deal."3 2 More-
over, regarding state procurement, "[r]estraint in this area is
also counseled by considerations of state sovereignty [and] the
role of each State 'as guardian and trustee for its people."' 3 3
The "market participant" cases still purported to leave Ja-
pan Line intact for the time being, because the Supreme Court
had limited its rulings to upholding state barriers to domestic,
not foreign, commerce.3 4 However, the writing was on the wall,
and the Court began pulling back from Japan Line. 35 In fact, a
federal appellate court extended the "market participant" analy-
sis to allow states to disfavor foreign suppliers as well as out-of-
state domestic ones. 3 6
Ultimately, in the Barclays Bank case, the Supreme Court
all but ended the era of the Japan Line "one voice" doctrine.37
32. Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429, 438-39 (1980) (quoting United
States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300, 307 (1919)).
33. Id. at 438 (quoting Heim v. McCall, 239 U.S. 175, 191 (1915)). Accord,
White v. Massachusetts Council of Construction Employers, Inc., 460 U.S. 204,
207 & n.3 (1983). For the doctrine's further development, see Big Country
Foods, Inc. v. Board of Educ., 952 F.2d 1173 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding that a
statutory preference requiring schools that received state funds to buy dairy
products produced within the state fell within the market participation
exception).
34. In fact, the Court carefully distinguished Japan Line, saying "that
Commerce Clause scrutiny may well be more rigorous when a restraint on for-
eign commerce is alleged. See Japan Line, Ltd." 447 U.S. at 437-38 n.9 (argu-
ing that the "power of states to affect foreign commerce is far more strictly
limited than is their power to affect interstate commerce"). Commentators still
thought state Buy American laws might not pass muster under the dormant
Foreign Commerce Clause. Note, supra note 27, at 412.
35. See Wardair Canada Inc. v. Florida Dept. of Revenue, 477 U.S. 1
(1986); Container Corp. of America v. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 159, 160-61
(1983) (distinguishing Japan Line). While these cases foreshadowed Barclays
Bank, there was still a serious. argument to be made against the state tax at
issue in that case. Elizabeth Harris, Desperate for Revenue: The States' Uncon-
stitutional Use of the Unitary Method to Apportion the Taxable Income of For-
eign Parent Corporations, 19 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 1077, 1086-1101 (1992).
36. Trojan Technologies, Inc. v. Pennsylvania, 916 F.2d 903, 912 (3d Cir.
1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2814 (1991).
37. Barclays Bank v. Franchise Tax Bd., 512 U.S. 298 (1994). See generally
Robert Charles Griffitts, Note, Broadening the States' Power to Tax Foreign
Multinational Corporations: Barclays Bank v. Franchise Tax Board, 46 CATH.
U. L. REV. 243 (1996).
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As in Japan Line, the Supreme Court scrutinized a California
tax method that burdened foreign enterprises. This time it re-
viewed the state's corporate income ("franchise") tax measured
for foreign multinationals by their worldwide income. Once
more, the foreign taxpayer asserted that the state tax would
trigger foreign retaliation, citing warnings by foreign countries.
The Executive Branch again filed a brief that agreed with the
foreign taxpayer. 38
Treating Japan Line as having been "effectively modified,"39
the Court upheld California's approach. It brushed aside any
concerns about retaliation, stating that "[t]he judiciary is not
vested with power to decide 'how to balance a particular risk of
retaliation against the sovereign right of the United States as a
whole to let the States tax as they please."' 40 In other words, the
Court withdrew from its previous practice of anticipating possi-
ble foreign retaliations and heading them off. Now, it would
leave the politically strenuous duty of making states obey for-
eign preferences to Congress.
Whereas in the Japan Line era the Court had heeded the
Executive Branch's wishes to override state laws, now the Court
attended to Congress's refusal to pass strong preemptive laws
as a protection of federalism. The Court gave the President's
view virtually no weight, declaring that "neither he nor we were
to make that decision, but only . . .Congress."4 1 Instead, the
Court carefully traced and recited the history of numerous Con-
gressional bills and hearings that had considered the matter.
Requests by the President to stop this state practice that had
gone unheeded now signified approval of it. The Court con-
cluded that "an unreceptive Congress . . . is not evidence that
the practice interfered with the Nation's ability to speak with
one voice." 42
The Court brushed aside the Japan Line "one voice" argu-
ment, stating that "Congress may more passively indicate" ac-
ceptance of state practices disfavoring foreign enterprises, and
that Congress "need not convey its intent with the unmistakable
clarity required to permit state regulation that discriminates
against interstate commerce." 43 The Barclays Bank opinion
38. 512 U.S. at 328 nn.29-30.
39. Id. at 319 n.18.
40. Id. at 328 (quoting Container Corp. of America, 463 U.S. at 194).
41. Id. at 329 (quoting Itel Containers Int'l Corp. v. Huddleston, 507 U.S.
60, 81 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring)).
42. Id.
43. Id. at 323.
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was a telling example of how the Senate protects the states. As
the Court explained, the Senate had rejected the version of a tax
treaty with the United Kingdom that would have protected Bar-
clays Bank against California's method of taxation. The Senate
then ratified a subsequent version of the treaty, utilizing its
power of reservation to specify that the treaty's provisions not
apply to states. 44
C. FEDERALISM'S STRUCTURAL PROTECTIONS IN THE
SEPARATION OF POWERS
While the Supreme Court's new doctrines pressured the
President from one side, structural protections in Congress pres-
sured him from the other. An eminent line of scholarly analysis
has traced the special protection that the legislative branch has
provided to federalism, most notably through the structuring of
the Senate.45 The bicameral Congress, with a state-based Sen-
ate, provides an immense reservoir of protection for the states.
At the center of this protection for state interests lies the
process of selecting the members of the two chambers of Con-
gress on a state-by-state, district-by-district basis. 46 Since each
member owes her election (as well as her prospects for reelec-
tion) to a local constituency, each must accommodate local inter-
ests. The chambers must, therefore, respond to the collective
sum of local interests. Moreover, the structure of Congress, with
its manifold "veto gates" and other means of delaying, amend-
ing, or defeating legislation, allows the hostility of a fraction of
the national population to have a significant impact. The enact-
ment of measures which too strongly encroach upon the states is
44. Id. at 327. For a discussion of the Senate's treaty reservation power
and procedure, see Michael J. Glennon, The Senate Role in Treaty Ratification,
77 AM. J. INT'L L. 257, 263-66 (1983).
45. See, e.g., Herbert Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism:
The Role of the States in the Composition and Selection of the National Govern-
ment, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 543 (1954) (arguing that Congress rather than the
Court has the ultimate authority for managing federalism); Kenneth W. Dam,
The American Fiscal Constitution, 44 U. CHI. L. REV. 271, 276 (1977) (arguing
that the "states have been left to do what the federal government chooses not to
do"). For a history of the procedure that epitomizes Senate protection of states,
see CHARLES TIEFER, CONGRESSIONAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 693-706 (1989).
46. Some commentators think that direct election of Senators, as opposed
to the pre-Seventeenth Amendment system of having state legislatures choose
them, markedly reduced the Senate's protections of federalism. Roger G.
Brooks, Comment, Garcia, The Seventeenth Amendment, and the Role of the
Supreme Court in Defending Federalism, 10 HARv. J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 189, 196-
208 (1987); William H. Riker, The Senate and American Federalism, 49 Am.
POL. Sci. REV. 452, 467-69 (1955).
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difficult, and sometimes impossible, absent special factors.
These realities are consonant with Supreme Court doctrines
that interpret statutes so as not to interfere with the states
without explicit congressional authorization. Proenforcement
forces must move explicit provisions past locally-accountable
resistance which can oppose all those "veto gates."47
Finally, simply having an elected legislative institution
with entirely different political accountability than the Presi-
dent's creates an impediment for the executive branch. Presi-
dents Bush and Clinton concluded that they should support
programs of negotiating and implementing international trade
agreements. Both perceived that the positive effects, namely ex-
port promotion and import cheapening, outweighed the adverse
job impacts likely to befall particular localities. These Presi-
dents would have had an easier time effectuating their shared
program in the 1990s if the Supreme Court had struck down
some or all of the state laws in the way. However, in the "mar-
ket participant" cases and the Barclays Bank decision, the feder-
alism-minded Court stopped voluntarily clearing adverse state
laws out of the way. This left the President to deal with the
states in some other fashion. 48
The President had the option of asking Congress, in the
course of the legislative implementation of such agreements, to
clear away any adverse state laws. The President, however,
found himself squeezed between the historic politics of trade,
particularly those of the 1990s, and the Court's profederalism
doctrines. 49 Furthermore, the elections of the last half-century
have made this an era of divided government, when Presidents
have rarely been the leaders of the majority party in Congress. 50
47. See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr., Overriding Supreme Court Statutory
Interpretation Decisions, 101 YALE L.J. 331, 359-72 (1991) (discussing the polit-
ical role of interest groups).
48. Such "decision[s] erroneously placed a burden upon the federal govern-
ment to actively legislate a prohibition on state Buy American laws should
these laws run counter to foreign trade policy." Geraldo Pascual, Note, State
Buy American Laws in a World of Liberal Trade, 7 CONN. J. INT'L L. 311, 311
(1992) (referring to Trojan Technologies, Inc. v. Pennsylvania, 499 U.S. 917
(1991)).
49. "[Nleither Congress nor the White House was willing in the early 1980s
to order state governments to abandon their unitary taxation formulas ... as a
result, they were basically bystanders as foreign-based multinational corpora-
tions pursued their case in the federal court system." Dr. Earl H. Fry, Sover-
eignty and Federalism: U.S. and Canadian Perspectives Challenges to
Sovereignty and Governance, 20 CAN.-U.S. L.J. 303, 311 (1994).
50. For an introduction to the general theory of postwar divided govern-
ment, see CHARLEs TIEFER, THE SEMI-SOVEREIGN PRESIDENCY 25-26 (1994).
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This diminishes their ability to resort to their parties to over-
come Congress's institutional resistance. In 1992, following a
national recession that hit hard locally, New Hampshire gave a
large primary vote to Pat Buchanan over President Bush, re-
flecting, in part, Buchanan's anti-free trade principles. In 1996,
following the national controversies surrounding the approval of
NAFTA and the Uruguay Round agreements, New Hampshire
gave an actual victory to Pat Buchanan, reflecting again, in part,
the state's views about trade. In addition, in both years the na-
tional electorate in the Presidential election gave a strikingly
large vote to H. Ross Perot, reflecting in part his anti-free trade
principles. A considerable faction of congressional Republicans,
looking at the strength in their own party primaries of Pat
Buchanan and H. Ross Perot, developed strong reservations
about trade agreements. 5 1
In Congress, the controversial nature of trade agreements
has split both parties. A large faction, on some matters a major-
ity, of congressional Democrats have strong reservations about
trade agreements, even those urged by President Clinton. For
example, in 1997 both the Democratic House minority leader
and minority whip opposed the renewal of "fast track" authority
unless labor and environmental protection played a more cen-
tral role. 52
Furthermore, as previously noted, the Barclays Bank opin-
ion itself cites a prime example of Senate protection of the
states, namely the rejection of one treaty with the United King-
dom and the Senate reservation upon its successor. Both of
these actions preserved state taxing authority. In addition, the
history of GATT is itself an example on a grand scale. The origi-
nal modern impetus for establishing international trade agree-
ments goes back to the post-Depression, post-World War II
reaction against the doleful history of high tariffs and their de-
structive effects on trade. However, the Senate would not ratify
the international agreements establishing GATT, either in the
initial version of the late 1940s Havana Charter for an Interna-
tional Trade Organization or in the more limited revised version
51. Trade Policy: Staffers See Little Activity in Trade for 104th Congress, 13
Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 8, at 280 (Feb. 21, 1996).
52. Trade Policy: Gephardt Opposes Open-Ended Authority for Fast Track
and Extension of NAFTA, 14 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 10, at 407 (Mar. 5,
1997); see also supra note 10.
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which involved an Organization for Trade Cooperation. 53 This
left GATT somewhat in limbo.54
Reflecting its protection of many interests, including feder-
alism, Congress hardly gave the President a free hand to imple-
ment international trade agreements domestically. After
decades of experience authorizing Presidents to negotiate recip-
rocal trade agreements, Congress ultimately adopted the Trade
Act of 1974, carried forward with modifications by the Trade
Agreement Act of 1979 and by modifying and renewing legisla-
tion in 1984 and 1988. 5 This legislation established a middle
ground for the 1990s between, on one hand, the unacceptable
alternative of Senate or congressional delegation to the Presi-
dent of complete freedom to negotiate any free trade arrange-
ments he wished, and on the other, the equally unacceptable
alternative of allowing congressional approval of individual
trade agreements to be bogged down in delays and floor
amendments .56
The 1974 Act created a system by which the President nego-
tiates agreements, anticipating the need to obtain congressional
approval, and then submits implementing bills for the trade
agreements to Congress. 57 Congress, in turn, binds itself proce-
durally to move the implementing bills submitted by the Presi-
dent along an internal "fast track," free from floor amendments
and excessive delays.58 "Fast track" treatment remains essen-
tial for effective Presidential negotiation of trade agreements.
The importance of "fast track" authority is illustrated by Presi-
dent Clinton's ongoing struggle to convince Congress to renew
this power, in preparation for the admittance of Chile to NAFTA
53. John H. Jackson, The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade in
United States Domestic Law, 66 MICH. L. REV. 250, 265-66 (1967).
54. President Truman adopted the revised version by executive act. This
made the effect of GATT on domestic law debatable in instances when particu-
lar agreements might be inconsistent with federal or state statutory law. See,
e.g., Thomas William France, The Domestic Legal Status of the GATT: The Need
for Clarification, 51 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1481, 1494-99 (1994).
55. Edmund W. Sir, Derailing the Fast Track for International Trade
Agreements, 5 FLA. INT'L L.J. 471, 475-81 (1990).
56. Harold Hongju Koh, The Fast Track and the United States Trade Pol-
icy, 18 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 143, 152-61 (1992).
57. Harold Hongju Koh, Congressional Controls on Presidential Trade Poli-
cymaking After I.N.S. v. Chadha, 18 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 1191, 1201-03
(1986).
58. 19 U.S.C. §§ 2191-2193 (1994).
[Vol. 7:45
1998] FREE TPYADE AGREEMENTS AND NEW FEDERALISM 59
in the short term, and for the consummation of the Free Trade
Area in the Americas agreement by 2005.59
However, the need for Congress to renew the "fast track"
legislation, and to pass an implementation bill for the trade
agreements, makes those trade agreements vulnerable to polit-
ical controversy. In addition, local antipathy to such agree-
ments remains strong, fueling Congressional reluctance. 60 The
short way to describe the result is that the Supreme Court's
profederalism doctrines forced the President to depend upon
congressionally-enacted preemption provisions exactly when the
structural protections for federalism in Congress magnified
political resistance to strong preemption. This is the situation
giving rise to the new paradigm of "weak" preemption.
The limits of NAFTA are a quiet, yet dramatic, demonstra-
tion of the strength of federalism's protections. The next section
will demonstrate how the Uruguay Round agreements affected
state procurement laws. NAFTA, which was concluded in
199261 and implemented by Congress in 1993,62 did not do much
in the state procurement area. In fact, NAFTA only applies to
federal government procurement, not to state procurement. 63
III. FEDERALISM'S NEW PROTECTIONS: 'WEAK"
PREEMPTION AND PARTNERING
A. SEPARATION OF POWERS AND "PARTNERING" IN
NEGOTIATION: URUGUAY ROUND EXAMPLE
The Uruguay Round negotiations focused on several state
issues. Most notably, the previous GATT Tokyo Round Agree-
ment on Government Procurement ("AGP")64 had deliberately
avoided the large sphere of state and local government procure-
59. See, e.g., I.M. DESTLER, RENEWING FAST-TRACK LEGISLATION 35-36
(1997); see also supra note 2.
60. For general introductions to the Congressional politics of trade, see Pie-
tro S. Nivola, Trade Policy: Refereeing the Playing Field, in A QUESTION OF BAL-
ANCE: THE PRESIDENT, THE CONGRESS AND FOREIGN POLICY 201, 218-29 (Thomas
E. Mann ed., 1990); JAMES A. ROBINSON, CONGRESS AND FOREIGN POLICY MAK-
ING: A STUDY IN LEGISLATIVE INFLUENCE AND INITIATIVE 59-61 (Norton E. Long
ed., rev. ed. 1967).
61. The North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, Can.-Mex.-
U.S., reprinted in 32 I.L.M. 296-456 & 605-800.
62. North American Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act, Pub. L.
No. 103-182, 107 Stat. 2057 (1993).
63. North American Free Trade Agreement, supra note 61, pt. 4, ch. 10,
sec. A, art. 1001.
64. Agreement on Government Procurement, Apr. 11, 1979, GATT B.I.S.D.
(26th Supp.) at 33 (1980); see generally Martin J. Golub & Sandra Lee Fenske,
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ment legislation because of anticipated resistance from the U.S.
Congress.65 As a result, the Uruguay Round negotiations aimed
to extend the AGP to state and local government procurement
laws. Similarly, the Uruguay Round Agreement on Trade in
Services 66 aimed to cover services, some of which the states reg-
ulate, such as banking and insurance. 67 In addition, the Agree-
ment on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Standards68 aimed at
uniformity in environmental laws, including state laws, that
might restrict commerce. 69 These latter two agreements paral-
leled the implications of NAFTA, in that state compliance would
be necessary. 70
Once the Uruguay Round negotiations got underway in
1990, U.S. negotiators proposed a voluntary compliance plan for
the states. Under this plan, signatories would attempt to obtain
agreement to coverage by subcentral government entities.7 1
The preliminary AGP proposal presumed a code drafted to apply
to some sphere of state and local procurement laws and govern-
ment-owned enterprises. Its actual coverage, though, would be
set out for each signatory country in schedules or annexes to the
agreement that would be collectively negotiated, but individu-
ally adapted to the particular situation of each signatory. As
this approach suggests, the Bush Administration could foresee
opposition from both the states and Congress for rules that
U.S. Government Procurement: Opportunities and Obstacles for Foreign Con-
tractors, 20 GEO. WASH. J. INT'L L. & ECON. 567 (1987).
65. "[Tlhere were at least some perceptions during the [Tokyo Round] ne-
gotiations that some members of Congress might have opposed approval of an
international government procurement code designed to apply to state govern-
ment purchases." JOHN H. JACKSON, ET AL., IMPLEMENTING THE TOKYO RouND:
NATIONAL CONSTITUTIONS AND INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RULES 200 (1984).
66. General Agreement on Trade in Services, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1B, LEGAL IN-
STRUMENTS-RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND, vol. 31; in 33 I.L.M. 44 (1994).
67. Jeffry Clay Clark, The United States Proposal for a General Agreement
on Trade in Services and its Preemption of Inconsistent State Law, 15 B.C. INT'L
& COMP. L. REV. 75, 86 (1992).
68. Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Meas-
ures, Dec. 15, 1993, GATT Doc. MTN/FA II-AIA-4.
69. Melinda Byrns O'Brien, The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade:
An International Agreement's Effect on Local Environmental Law, 5 INT'L LEGAL
PERsP., Fall 1993, at 88-91.
70. Kenneth J. Cooper, To Compel or Encourage: Seeking Compliance with
International Trade Agreements at the State Level, 2 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE
143, 156-59 (1993).
71. James D. Southwick, Binding the States: A Survey of State Law Con-
formance With the Standards of the GATT Procurement Code, 13 U. PA. INT'L
BUS. L. 57, 63 (1992).
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would uniformly preempt in-state procurement preferences in
all fifty states. As in its other approaches to the Uruguay
Round, the administration planned ahead to negotiate only
what would be acceptable to the states.7 2
In response to a request by U.S. Trade Representative Carla
Hills, the National Governors' Association passed a resolution in
August 1991 urging its members to pledge to keep their states'
nondiscriminatory procurement practices open by placing them
under the coverage of the Government Procurement Code.7 3 Ac-
cordingly, the United States was able to offer that its annexes to
NAFTA would list the coverage of twenty-four states. This
meant that twenty-four states had voluntarily agreed to let the
federal government include them in its coverage. 7 4 Here, the
"partnering" approach had already manifested itself. The Presi-
dent was not imposing international obligations on hapless
states. Rather, he was gathering the states' concessions and
then, almost as a spokesman for a league of sovereigns, was
presenting to other nations what the American states had
offered.
By 1992, the voluntary state compliance portion of the Uru-
guay Round talks had temporarily stalled.75 The United States
had objected that European government-owned enterprises, like
national telecommunications and utility companies, were not
open. Meanwhile, the Europeans complained that more than
half of the U.S. states applied "buy local" policies, as did thirteen
of the twenty-four largest U.S. cities. 76 When the Europeans de-
72. Clark, supra note 67, at 106 (describing 1990 survey of fifty states' ser-
vice regulatory systems).
73. Governors Adopt Resolutions Supporting NAFTA, GATT Procurement,
8 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 34, at 1237 (Aug. 21, 1991).
74. Steven S. Diamond & Rosemary Maxwell, Opening the International
Government Marketplace: New Developments on the NAFTA, U.S.-EC, and
GATT Fronts, 62 Fed. Cont. Rep. (BNA), at n.82 and accompanying text (July
25, 1994).
75. The lead in this matter was taken by negotiations between the Euro-
pean Union and the United States on a bilateral agreement on government pro-
curement, akin to the U.S.-Canada free trade agreement approved in 1979.
These bilateral talks had stalled over the question of the balance between the
size of the sectors that the European Union and the United States were each
offering to open (their "tenders"). Gerard De Graaf& Matthew King, Towards a
More Global Government Procurement Market: The Expansion of the GATT
Government Procurement Agreement in the Context of the Uruguay Round, 29
INT'L LAW. 435 (1995).
76. Id. at 442-43. See also SERVICES OF THE COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN
COMMUNITIES, REPORT ON UNITED STATES TRADE BARRIERS AND UNFAIR PRAC-
TICES 1991: PROBLEMS OF DOING BUSINESS WITH THE U.S. 53-57 (1991) (listing
state procurement preferences). It is open to question whether the Europeans
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manded more, American negotiators had to pause for consulta-
tion with the states. While negotiations had progressed on other
points by April 1993, the United States was not initially ready to
make commitments for the coverage of its states and localities.
As talks continued, the U.S. Trade Representative for the
Clinton administration obtained voluntary commitments from
thirty-three states.77 Ultimately, the United States was able to
improve its offer to thirty-seven states that agreed to be bound
by the AGP. These included the five largest states (California,
New York, Texas, Illinois, and Florida), accounting for approxi-
mately eighty percent of total state procurement. 78
As for the notion of "partnering," it is worth noting that the
National Governors' Association resisted challenging the AGP
on federalism grounds. On the contrary, the National Gover-
nors' Association sparked the support for negotiating the AGP,
just as the National Association of State Procurement Officers
("NASPO") came forward as a major avenue for effectuating it.
The pro-trade states, which possessed an overwhelming portion
of the national economy, used the executive branch as their bro-
ker, their mediator, and ultimately their solution to the "Pris-
oner's Dilemma"7 9 of arranging among a majority of the states a
collective position for an international deal.
An important controversy during NAFTA's implementation
took the relationship between the federal and state governments
a step further. One of the chief controversies regarding
NAFTA's implementation concerned the Mexican trucking in-
dustry's transportation of goods into the United States. NAFTA
signaled a commitment to opening the border states to Mexican
trucking, and initially the President moved forward with that
commitment. A defender of federalism might well characterize
the situation as a bullying executive branch overriding what
states chose for themselves. After all, the Executive Branch did,
in fact, take the issue into its own hands by preempting state
truck driver licensing laws.80 In so doing, it overrode the ability
cared as intensely about opening American state and local procurement as they
seemed to be, or if instead they pressed the point partly to counterbalance the
sensitive issues being advanced by the American side. Certainly the issue of
"buy local" policies had also become important in the negotiations leading up to
the Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement, which took effect in late 1987 and
early 1988 (and which was superseded by NAFTA).
77. De Graaf & King, supra note 75, at 444.
78. Id. at 447-49.
79. Bednar & Eskridge, supra note 3, at 1471-72.
80. Robert F. Housman, Democratizing International Trade Decision-Mak-
ing, 27 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 699, 741 (1994).
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of the California state legislature to continue enforcement of its
licensing requirements. 8 '
Once NAFTA went into effect, the Republican governors of
the states along the U.S.-Mexican border expressed a desire for
a vigorous implementation of NAFTA.8 2 It was President Clin-
ton who deferred this aspect of NAFTA's implementation. The
governors' group which criticized him did so not on the grounds
that one might have imagined, that of as a President too roughly
imposing international trade interests. Instead, they criticized
the President for moving too slowly and gently in imposing the
international trade measures that these governors wanted.8 3
Once again, the President emerged not as a national dicta-
tor of internationally derived commands. Instead, he emerged
as the broker and mediator among states which differed primar-
ily in their willingness to make concessions to foreign enter-
prises in order to support free trade. Because the Supreme
Court had largely removed itself from the business of striking
down state laws disadvantaging foreign enterprise, the Presi-
dent's negotiation of trade agreements had to occur in partner-
ship with state political processes in order to broker a solution
capable of achieving congressional approval.
B. SEPARATION OF POWERS AND "VEAK" PREEMPTION IN
RECENT AGREEMENT IMPLEMENTATION LAWS
Even after the President, with state support, negotiated the
Uruguay Round agreements, the agreements still required af-
firmative congressional approval in the form of an implementa-
tion bill. It was during this approval process that the new
81. Patti Goldman, The Democratization of the Development of United
States Trade Policy, 27 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 631, 653-54 (1994).
82. NAFTA: Border Governors Pledge Fight Against NAFTA Circumven-
tion Efforts, 13 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 23, at 942 (June 5, 1996); NAFTA:
Key GOP Members Question Decision to Delay Mexico Trucking Provisions, 13
Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 2, at 42 (Jan. 10, 1996). The governors have many
views that differ from those of state legislators, including how foreign competi-
tion undermines the Teamsters Union for the benefit of the governors' own
political supporters among their states' business interests.
83. Trucking Provision Implementation Urged by Industry, State Officials,
14 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 10, at 27 (Mar. 5, 1997); see also supra note 1.
Proposals to admit Mexican trucking elicited the respectable opposition of the
insurer's association, at least partly because of comparative laxity in Mexican
truck driver licensing. The individual states traditionally decide whether to ac-
cept foreign truck drivers' licenses.
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"weak" preemption mechanism, previously devised for
NAFTA,s 4 had its greatest impact.
Under the "fast track" mechanism, both the President and
Congress engaged in intense joint consideration of the Uruguay
Round agreements even before they were concluded in April
1994. Congress began a series of committee hearings during the
negotiations. 85 By July 1994, the states had expressed strong
concerns about the Uruguay Round agreements, including the
AGP. A letter signed by forty-two state attorneys general was
sent to the President and reprinted in the Congressional Record.
Among its list of "serious concerns" were "[w]hether GATT
grants any private party a right of action to challenge a State
law in federal court," "[wihether States may maintain public
procurement laws that favor in-State business in bidding for
public contracts, and "[wihether the implementing legislation
adequately guarantees States that the federal government will
genuinely consider accepting trade sanctions rather than pres-
suring States to change State laws which are successfully chal-
lenged in the WTO."8 6
It was not until September 27, 1994, that the President
transmitted to Congress H.R. 5220, the implementation bill for
84. A system similar to the one described below for the Uruguay Round
agreements effectuates NAFTA with regard to state laws. See North American
Free Trade Association Implementation Act, Pub. L. No. 103-182, § 102(b), 107
Stat. 2057 (1993), codified at 19 U.S.C. § 3301(b). It is explained by an Admin-
istration Statement and a legislative history similar to the one for the Uruguay
Round agreements. H.R. Rep. No. 103-361 (1993), reprinted in 1993
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2552.
85. The House Report on the Uruguay Round agreements summarizes the
House hearings:
Following the 120-day advance notice to Congress on December 15,
1993, of the President's intent to enter into the agreements, the full
Committee held a hearing on January 26, 1994, followed by four days
of comprehensive Subcommittee hearings on February 1, 2, 8 and 22 to
review the final results of the Uruguay Round negotiations (Serial No.
103-73). Finally, the full Committee held a hearing on June 10, 1994
on the World Trade Organization and its implications for U.S.
sovereignty.
H.R. Rep. No. 103-826, pt. 1, at 19-20 (1994), reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N., at
3791-92.
86. 140 Cong. Rec. S8853 (daily ed. July 13, 1994). The Congressional Rec-
ord also reprinted an intense critique by the state-organized Multistate Tax
Commission of a GATT panel ruling on Canada's challenge to certain U.S. tax
laws regarding beer. This critique fleshed out the states' legal concerns that the
procedures used to effectuate GATT principles were too intrusive. 140 Cong.
Rec. S8856 (daily ed. July 13, 1994) (concerning the panel decision commonly
known as the "Beer II" decision).
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the Uruguay Round agreements.8 7 The President also submit-
ted a "Statement of Administrative Action. s8 8 To further clarify
the matter, the U.S. Trade Representative provided a set of an-
swers to questions from NASPO.8 9
The hearings on the Uruguay Round agreements included a
memorable debate that once more reflected the structural pro-
tection of federalism in Congress. 90 Professor Laurence Tribe of
Harvard Law School questioned the constitutionality of approv-
ing the agreements by legislation. He argued that the Constitu-
tion only envisaged such an agreement as a treaty requiring
ratification by two-thirds of the Senate, a level of support the
agreements might not achieve. Professor Bruce Ackerman of
Yale Law School defended the constitutionality of legislatively
implementing the agreements. The debate between the two
professors exposed the vulnerability that the executive branch
would experience if it attempted to impose too harsh a preemp-
tive regime upon the states in the form of a trade agreement.
States opposed to the trade agreement would have supple-
mented their direct opposition with the constitutional argument
offered by Professor Tribe that federalism-threatening strong
preemption should occur only with the advice and consent of
two-thirds of the Senate.
After a hard struggle, President Clinton obtained enact-
ment of the implementation bills for NAFTA and the Uruguay
Round agreements. 9 1 It is fair to say that enactment required
all the steps that had been taken to reduce opposition. For pur-
poses of this Article, the most pertinent step was the creation of
the "weak" preemption mechanism.
While NAFTA and the Uruguay Round agreements seemed
to substantively establish rights for foreign enterprises, ag-
grieved foreign businesses might have hoped for a more potent
litigative recourse. The incomplete nature of the substantive
rules in these agreements makes the remedies particularly im-
portant. The agreements describe many of the applicable princi-
87. H.R. Rep. No. 103-826, pt. 2, at 2 (1994), reprinted in 1994
U.S.C.C.A.N. 4013.
88. Id. at 4040.
89. These are reprinted in Margaret E. McConnell, The Code's Adaptability
to Some New Trends, in RIDING THE WAVE OF CHANGE IN STATE AND LOcAL PRO-
CUREMENT, 1995 A.B.A. SEC. PUB. CONT. L. § E.
90. GATT Implementing Legislation: Hearing on S. 2467 Before the Sen.
Comm. On Commerce, Science, and Transportation, 103d Cong. 285-339 (1994).
91. I.M. DESTLER, AMERICAN TRADE POLITIcS 222-28 (3d ed. 1995) (describ-
ing the enactment of NAFTA's implementation bill), 251-54 (describing the en-
actment of the Uruguay Round implementation bill).
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ples so incompletely that they have received the label "political
theatre." "[As to] the WTO's foundation agreements .... Cracks
can be found in all of the major agreements in the package, in-
cluding agreements regarding agriculture, services, intellectual
property, and textiles. In no case is the real meaning of these
agreements what it appears to be." 92 As another commentator
put it, "[w]hile the General Agreement on Trade in Services
(GATS) purports to extend unconditional MFN to trade in serv-
ices, the working provisions read more like an oratory wish list
than a binding set of regulations."93
Two examples of the types of controversy that can arise
should further clarify why the remedies matter so much. The
AGP purports to forbid state laws that discriminate in favor of
in-state suppliers and against foreign suppliers. However, the
AGP does not invalidate "in-state preference" laws on their face.
Instead, states remain free to have in-state preferences, so long
as they apply them only to foreign suppliers from non-signatory
countries and to domestic suppliers from the other forty-nine
states. Since most state suppliers are domestic, states have
much of the same motivation for in-state preferences as they al-
ways have.
However, as long as a state has such a preference on its
books, its state procurement officers obviously may refrain on
some occasions from relieving foreign suppliers from the effects
of the state preference. In these cases, it is critically important
whether the aggrieved foreign supplier has a quick and easy ju-
dicial remedy available or is instead required to take a long,
roundabout, expensive, and uncertain route in pursuit of uncer-
tain relief.
In another context, both the Uruguay Round agreements
and NAFTA aroused concern based on their potential to override
state and local environmental laws. 94 The Uruguay Round San-
itary and Phytosanitary Agreement9 5 requires that govern-
ments "accept the sanitary or phytosanitary measures of other
Members as equivalent ... if the exporting Member objectively
demonstrates... that its measures achieve the importing Mem-
92. Robert E. Hudec, International Economic Law: The Political Theatre
Dimension, 17 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 9, 14 (1996).
93. Kim, supra note 11, at 1006-07.
94. O'Brien, supra note 69, at 86-120; Ursula Kettlewell, GATT - Will Lib-
eralized Trade Aid Global Environmental Protection?, 21 DENV. J. INT'L L. &
POL'Y 55 (1992).
95. Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Meas-
ures, supra note 68.
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ber's appropriate level of... protection." 96 When a state decides
that a foreign measure is not "equivalent," the foreign supplier
challenging this determination has an obvious interest in the
remedies available. In addition, the Technical Barriers to Trade
Agreement 97 allows state environmental protections, provided
"that the measures are not applied in a manner which would
constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimina-
tion. '98 Commonly, the political coalition supporting a state or
local environmental provision combines local producers or their
employees, who plainly have protectionist goals, with some
number of environmental advocates. The ability of an aggrieved
foreign enterprise to overcome the state measure will depend on
both the relative strength of the environmental justification for
the provision and the ease and effectiveness of the available
remedy. To put it differently, the absence of any preemptive
remedy, making state compliance totally voluntary, is not ex-
pected to produce meaningful results.
As previously discussed, under the Foreign Commerce
Clause, foreign interests had enjoyed the right to apply directly
to the federal courts in challenging allegedly protectionist state
laws. They did not have to get the federal executive branch to
help, although this support was available in major test cases
where foreign countries had asked for the assistance of the exec-
utive branch. Moreover, foreign suppliers found the ease and
independence of the federal judicial system much more effective
than asking their own governments to help them through slow
and uncertain international diplomatic processes. Foreign en-
terprises which might invoke NAFTA and the Uruguay Round
agreements against state barriers might have hoped to get a
similar private federal judicial remedy. Unfortunately for them,
they did not.
Congress dramatically closed the federal courthouse doors
to such challenges. It should be recalled that one of the ques-
tions the forty-two state attorneys general asked was "whether
GATT grants any private party a right of action to challenge a
State law in Federal court." Section 102(c) of the Uruguay
96. Id. art. 4(1); see also Zane 0. Gresham & Thomas A. Bloomfield, Rheto-
ric or Reality: The Impact of the Uruguay Round Agreement on Federal and
State Environmental Laws, 35 SANTA CLA L. REV. 1143, 1154 (1995) (quoting
agreement).
97. Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, opened for signature Apr.
12, 1979, 31 U.S.T. 405.
98. Id. preamble; see also Gresham & Bloomfield, supra note 96, at 1156
(quoting agreement).
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Round implementation law bars private causes of action or de-
fenses based on the Uruguay Round agreements. 99 It precludes
any private suit against any state on the ground that the state
has taken a procurement action inconsistent with the
agreements.100
The Administration and Congress, thus, deliberately took
away from aggrieved foreign suppliers the ability to bring the
type of legal action that historically had been the most powerful
tool in breaking down state discrimination against out-of-state
business. There are other contexts in which the federal courts
have been held back from enforcing otherwise applicable federal
law on grounds of federalism. Specifically, there are three differ-
ent levels of remedy limitation to restrain the federal courts.
First, the Eleventh Amendment protects the state treasuries
against federal court suits.' 0 1 Second, Congress's enactment of
measures such as the Tax Anti-Injunction Act protects the col-
lection of state taxes. 10 2 Third, there are judicially established
abstention principles, such as those for state criminal prosecu-
tions.10 3 With respect to the sensitive federalism issues raised
by the substantively preemptive international agreements, Con-
gress and the President together decided to leave the states
alone by keeping the flash-point of conflict away from foreign en-
terprises suing in federal district courts.
That still leaves the aggrieved foreign enterprise a remedy
that both domestic and foreign suppliers use against allegedly
illegal state actions-the state's own judicial remedies. The ex-
tent to which a foreign supplier can raise the Uruguay Round
agreements or NAFTA in a state judicial forum poses an inter-
esting question. It can be argued that no state'judicial forum
has the power to entertain such an issue.'0 4 Congress went out
99. 19 U.S.C. § 3512(c)(1)(A).
100. 19 U.S.C. § 3512(c)(1)(B). See also Julie Long, Note, Racheting Up Fed-
eralism: A Supremacy Clause Analysis of NAFTA and the Uruguay Round
Agreements, 80 MINN. L. REV. 231, 261 (1995).
101. RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., DANIEL J. MELTZER, & DAVID L. SHAPIRO,
HART & WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 1041-1105
(4th ed. 1996).
102. Id. at 1189-1212.
103. Id. at 1225-1336.
104. The legislative history says that "[u]nder this section, no state law may
be declared invalid on the ground that it is inconsistent with the Uruguay
Round Agreement, except in an action brought by the United States for the
purpose of declaring such law invalid." H.R. REP. No. 103-826, pt. 2, at 16
(1994), reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4013, 4028. The provision regarding ac-
tions by the United States provides for suits only in federal court, so that it may
be that no state law may be declared invalid on this ground in state court.
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of its way to declare in the implementation law that its "intent"
was to preclude such a scenario from arising. This involved the
unusual situation where the statute's words explicitly specify
Congressional intent:
INTENT OF CONGRESS-It is the intention of the Congress through
paragraph (1) to occupy the field with respect to any cause of action or
defense under or in connection with any of the Uruguay Round Agree-
ments, including by precluding any person other than the United
States from bringing any action against any State or political subdivi-
sion thereof or raising any defense to the application of State law
under or in connection with any of the Uruguay Round Agreements
105
Nothing about this declaration of intent limits its applica-
bility to actions in federal court. The words of the text, the ad-
ministrative intent, and the legislative history apply equally to
actions in state fora. As the Administration explained, keeping
these issues out of the court system involved conscious foreign
affairs goals.1 0 6 Surely, Congress and the President together
have the power, in negotiating and approving an international
agreement, to keep it from being raised in any administrative or
judicial forum, including that of a state.
On the other hand, whether all the state courts will keep
away from these issues is another matter. In the past, state
courts have heard, and will continue to hear, appeals by foreign
enterprises, such as appeals by rejected bidders on state con-
tracts. Thus, their doors will probably remain open. With the
foreign enterprises present on one side and the state authorities
present on the other, it will require conscious effort for state
judges to resist eliciting and considering the state authorities'
defense of state actions allegedly violating the Uruguay Round
agreements or NAFTA. A state court might find some parallel
right under state law to whatever these agreements provide.
A particularly intriguing question under the new "weak"
preemption is what will occur if a state court mistakenly applies
a trade agreement to override a state law. Can the state govern-
ment, or some aggrieved domestic party, seek review of the state
court action in the Supreme Court or a lower federal court? The
105. 19 U.S.C. § 3512(c)(2).
106. With respect to the states, section 102(c) represents a determina-
tion by the Congress and the Administration that private lawsuits are
not an appropriate means for ensuring state compliance with the Uru-
guay Round agreements. Suits of this nature may interfere with the
President's conduct of trade and foreign relations and with suitable
resolution of disagreement or disputes under those agreements.
1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4013, 4055.
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Supreme Court might well have the authority to review state
court mistakes concerning federal trade law in order to give ef-
fect to Congress's intent that these agreements not be raised in
these courts at all. However, Supreme Court review is rare and
difficult to secure. Whether foreign enterprises could get a fed-
eral district court to review a case in order to effectuate Con-
gress's intent that no private cause of action exists in state court
is a more complex question.
Section 102(b)(2) of the implementing bill does establish the
authority of the U.S. Attorney General to file an action in federal
court to declare a state law invalid for being inconsistent with
the Uruguay Round agreements. 10 7 However, both the legisla-
tive history and the Administration Statement make clear that
"[t]he authority conferred on the United States under this para-
graph is intended to be used only as a 'last resort.''108 This sim-
ply reinforces the presumption that the Attorney General would
be unlikely to file such actions merely to effectuate the law or to
please foreign enterprises. The executive branch and Congress
anticipated that this authority would only be used to deal with
foreign governments that apply pressure through the WTO
panel process or at some other level which forces the federal gov-
ernment to act to vindicate the agreements. The Attorney Gen-
eral will likely fulfill these expectations.
C. How THE NEW "WEAK" PREEMPTION DEFERS TO
FEDERALISM
The NAFTA and Uruguay Round agreements implementa-
tion bills establish an extraordinarily attenuated remedial pro-
cess for the aggrieved foreign business. First, the foreign
business must enlist its government, which must then invoke a
public international law process, such as the WTO panel pro-
cess. Even that marks only the beginning of "weak" preemption.
In addition, only nations can participate as parties in the
panel process. However, Congress did not give federal authori-
ties complete control over the handling of a foreign nation's com-
plaint about a state law or action. Once a signatory nation files
a complaint with the WTO alleging that an American state prac-
tice violates an agreement, the complaint will be referred to a
panel. The panel receives written and oral submissions from the
other nation and from the U.S. Trade Representative. While the
107. 19 U.S.C. § 3512(b)(2)(B).
108. 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4013, 4029.
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American state, as a "subfederal entity," does not formally par-
ticipate as a party, the implementation bill provides for the
Trade Representative to consult and involve the state. 0 9 The
Administration submitted a statement elaborating on the degree
of consultation required. 110
Even if the panel concludes that the American state's prac-
tice violates the AGP, "the Uruguay Round agreements do not
automatically 'preempt' or invalidate state laws that do not con-
form to the rules set out in those agreements.""' The imple-
mentation law provides that after such a panel ruling, "the
Trade Representative shall consult with the State concerned in
an effort to develop a mutually agreeable response to the report
of the panel."1" 2 The Administration Statement and legislative
history anticipated that an elaborate "cooperative approach"" 13
would be followed. In addition, NAFTA provided for a similar
mandatory process of federal consultations with the states. 114
Even if the Attorney General files such a suit, the imple-
menting law favors the state by assigning the burden of proof to
the United States, 1 15 by explicitly denying binding effect or even
deference to the panel ruling, 1 6 and by allowing the court to
consider the matter de novo. l" 7 Moreover, the Supreme Court's
deference to federalism might also help the state.
The details of each part of what Congress sets up matter
less than how the overall system of "weak" preemption operates.
State authorities receive complete protection against the strong-
est but most aggravating remedy, the private federal court suit.
They arguably even receive statutory protection against private
state court suit. A complainant must work through foreign gov-
ernments and diplomatic channels seeking to get first its own
109. 19 U.S.C. § 3512(b)(1)(C)(ii,iii).
110. 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4013, 4050-54.
111. Id. at 4028.
112. 19 U.S.C. § 3512(b)(1)(c)(iv).
113. 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4013, 4029.
114. A.J. Tangeman, NAFTA and the Changing Role of State Government in
a Global Economy: Will the NAFTA Federal-State Consultation Process Preserve
State Sovereignty?, 20 SEArILE U. L. REV. 243, 265-69 (1996).
115. 19 U.S.C. § 3512(b)(2)(B)(ii).
116. 19 U.S.C. § 3512(b)(2)(B)(i).
117. As the legislative history and the Administration Statement explain:
"The United States would base any such proceeding on the provisions of the
relevant Uruguay Round Agreement-not a panel report-and the court would
thus consider the matter de novo .... [Tihe court would reach its own, in-
dependent interpretation of the relevant provisions [of the Agreement]." 1994
U.S.C.C.A.N. 4013, 4040.
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country, then a WTO panel or parallel NAFTA committee, and
finally the U.S. government, to go its way.
Even in these proceedings, the U.S. government is less a
controlling and commanding figure than a mediating entity that
consults with the sovereign state. As the Mexican trucking con-
troversy demonstrated, the President may be less inclined than
the state governors to break down American barriers for foreign
enterprises. Furthermore, foreign governments may not push
the President too hard because of political considerations. Only
after a long process, where the foreign government insists on a
formal proceeding and the federal government loses, can the for-
eign business attempt to overcome the state in court. Even
then, though, the state has its own cards to play in the ensuing
court proceeding.
Ultimately, this results in delay, deferral, and a long se-
quence of political processes and buffers to complement the
highly attenuated legal remedy. "Weak" preemption exists less
as a legal tool for private complainants to use in breaking down
state trade barriers than as a series of occasions for federal and
state administrative and other authorities to discuss the subject.
Dual sovereignty of this kind is familiar. Federal and state au-
thorities prosecute, tax, regulate, procure, and conduct all kinds
of administrative business side-by-side, negotiating their differ-
ences generally without judicial recourse. "Weak" preemption
thus parallels familiar aspects of the working world of dual
American sovereignty and develops those familiar aspects in the
entirely new realm of international trade agreement
implementation.
IV. CONCLUSION
In the 1990s, the President's potential ability to negotiate
trade agreements affecting state laws was squeezed from two
sides. The profederalism dormant commerce clause doctrines of
the Supreme Court meant that state laws could no longer be
cleared away to enable trade agreements to take effect. Mean-
while, efforts to find some other way to forcibly direct the states
faced the Constitution's structural protection for federalism,
namely Congress's solicitude for local interests. This situation
was exacerbated by the past decade's divisive, party-splitting
politics of trade, with strong factions in Congress opposing
agreements on a variety of grounds and likely to resist their im-
plementation by emphasizing any tendency for those agree-
ments to "strongly" prempt state laws.
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The solution lay in a new paradigm for federalism and free
trade. Part of this consists of a new form of international negoti-
ation that essentially makes states "partners" with the Presi-
dent. In effect, the President becomes less the director of a
national sovereign government and more a broker finding com-
mon ground between differing state governments. The other
part consists of "weak" preemption. In this implementation for-
mat, foreign enterprises have few or no legal tools for overcom-
ing state actions. Instead, a series of political processes exist to
enable federal and state authorities to resolve the rare situation
in which a foreign government applies major pressure upon the
United States because a state has violated the agreements.
Why does this new paradigm work for the President? It is
noticeable that the Supreme Court has become considerably
more sanguine, as evidenced by its shift from Japan Line to Bar-
clays Bank, in how it views the prospect of foreign government
retaliation for state "anti-foreign" actions. In the trade sphere,
as distinct from some aspects of the defense sphere during the
Cold War, foreign retaliation is not a matter of catastrophic war
or peace. It is a matter of dollars and cents, or more accurately
dollars and other currency. In the large trade agreement pic-
ture, the President can count his efforts a success if he can show
enough likelihood of states acquiescing in negotiated agree-
ments to satisfy the other countries that there is sufficient mu-
tuality of obligation. While imperfect compliance does not wreck
the nation's position in international affairs, 118 it poses a polit-
ical problem with modest economic dimensions for which polit-
ical solutions suffice.
The next decade may, therefore, bring flaws or delays in
how some state and local governments comply with interna-
tional agreements. However, the inclusion of the states as "part-
ners" in the negotiations, and the eagerness of many states to
make concessions to promote trade, guarantee a significant level
of compliance. On that basis, the President will seek congres-
sional renewal of fast-track authority to negotiate agreements
and accept being dealt the same comparatively "weak" hand in
what he can promise foreign countries in the way of American
domestic implementation as he sits down at the table to negoti-
118. Other nations, like Canada, may have worse problems than the United
States when it comes to making their subnational governments live by interna-
tional agreements. See generally Greg N. Anderson, Note, Achieving United
States-Canadian Reciprocity in Sub-National Government Procurement: Feder-
alism and the Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement, 4 IND. INT'L &
COMP. L. REV. 131 (1993).
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ate the next decade's agreements. Foreign countries will merely
factor that in as they defend the imperfections in their own level
of compliance with past agreements and their own limitations
on implementation of future ones.
In this fashion, the American "dual sovereignty" system will
get on with the negotiation of trade agreements with other na-
tions at a pace which will depend on political forces. As experi-
ence with it accumulates, "weak" preemption will take its place
in the tool-kit of federal-state legal relations. What Winston
Churchill said of democracy in general, he could have said in
particular for how a "dual sovereign" democracy handles inter-
national trade relations: watching it in operation, it seems like
the worst possible system of government-except for all the
others.
